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The Shadow of Homeland
Politics: Understanding the
Evolution of the Turkish Radical
Left in the Netherlands
Liza M. NELL*
Migrants’ transnational loyalties and practices are the subjects of hot political
debate in many European countries. Critics often worry about the influence of political
transnationalism on domestic politics: do migrants ‘import’ foreign government
influence? Does political transnationalism threaten democracy? If migrants and their
descendants are actively involved in homeland politics does this signal indifference
towards politics in their countries of residence? Does political transnationalism thereby
hinder integration (as for example is stated by Koopmans, Statham, Giugni and Passy,
2005)?
These are big questions. They are also loaded questions, asked from the
perspective of European governments. But the consequences of political trans-
nationalism can only be understood once the phenomenon is studied transnationally
– by examining causes and effects in both receiving countries and the in countries of
origin.
Extant scholarship has identified a number of factors that play an important
role in the evolution of transnational politics. In particular, these include political
opportunities in the country of settlement and/or in the country of origin (Koopmans,
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Statham, Giugni and Passy, 2005; Koopmans and Statham, 2003; Ögelman, 2003;
Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003); migrants’ length of stay (Foner, 2001; Guarnizo, Portes and
Haller, 2003; Morowska, 2003; Al-Ali, Black and Koser, 2001); and their migration
motives (Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003). The scholarship has also shown that organisations
often form the backbone of political transnationalism; because they channel individual
activities, organisations are central in many studies (Ögelman, 2003; Østergaard-
Nielsen, 2003; Argun, 2003). In important ways, then, understanding organisational
patterns becomes synonymous with understanding political transnationalism itself. 
Organisational patterns – and the transnational activities they channel –
change over time. Once migrants settle permanently, some organisations disappear
while new ones are formed. The political focus of migrants’ organisations also shifts,
often (though not always) towards issues in the country of settlement. At this most
general level, many studies of transnational politics ask a deceptively simple question:
what explains this variation – over time, between different migrant communities, and
between different organisations and political currents?
This paper follows this line of analysis with a sharpened focus. It addresses
the evolution of radical left transnational political organisations among Turkish
migrants in the Netherlands. Within this political segment, trajectories have differed
markedly. Many radical organisations, particularly in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
were short-lived. Of the organisations that still exist, some have become more
moderate; others have retained their radical edge. The focus of these radical
organisations has also shifted over time: many have grown more interested in the
position of their members in Dutch society than in political conditions in Turkey. This,
however, is not true for all of them: a number of organisations retain their ambition to
influence Turkish politics. This variation, then, forms the core empirical puzzle of this
paper: what explains the different trajectories of transnationally active radical left
Turkish organisations in the Netherlands?
While political opportunities, migration motives and length of stay are
relevant to our case, they cannot, in themselves, explain important differences between
the political trajectories of different leftwing Turkish migrant groups. For most of the
groups studied in this paper, the above factors have been similar or have remained
constant. For example, virtually all radical left movements were outlawed in Turkey
after the coup in 1980. Many of the migrant organisations studied here were set up in
similar times, under similar conditions, by people with similar migration motives. And
while the political climate for left movements in Turkey has changed several times over
the past decades, the effect on migrant organisations abroad should have been roughly
comparable. So what explains the variation between the trajectories of these
organisations?
Many migrants are not only active transnationally; they are also organised in
transnational networks. Most leftwing Turkish migrant organisations maintained active
contacts with their counterparts in Turkey, or with those in exile in other European
countries. In many cases, organisations in the Netherlands functioned as branches of
movements in Turkey. Conversely, movements operating clandestinely in Turkey had
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their operational bases abroad. As an organisation, however, the Turkish and (in this
case) Dutch branches co-operated closely. Under which conditions were organisational
structures in the Netherlands directed from Turkey? For organisations in the
Netherlands without legal counterparts in Turkey, the opposite question arises: under
which conditions were organisational structures determined by political opportunities
in the Netherlands? And how did political developments in Turkey influence
organisational structure? Did organisations in the Netherlands survive developments in
Turkey, or did they change their goals and activities?
To answer these questions, the next section provides a broad historical sketch
of left political movements since the 1960s, focusing on those that have mattered to
Turkish migrant organisations in the Netherlands. The aim here is to provide some
background to a bewildering political landscape. The empirical core of the paper,
which follows, is divided into three parts: the first concentrates on developments up to
the fall of the Berlin wall, a watershed for the left in Turkey as well as for affiliated
organisations in the Netherlands. The following two sections then focus on the period
since the early 1990s, more specifically on the transnational ties of Turkish migrant
organisations with (1) parties that are now legal in Turkey, and (2) with organisations
that remain prohibited there.
THE LEFT IN TURKEY
When I asked for political asylum in the Netherlands in 1981 the interrogator
handed me a long list of Turkish left organisations, asking me to point out the one
in which I was active. The list was so long, I had never even heard of some before
– and they all had exile members in the Netherlands!1
This quote is telling of the myriad Turkish left organisations and their
presence in the Netherlands. The late 1960s and early 1970s was a period of intense
activity for the Turkish left. Influenced by developments in Turkey, ideological
differences within the international socialist movement, and internal conflicts, the ‘left
movement’ broke into numerous splinter groups. With the arrival of refugees from
Turkey, these groups came to be represented among Turks in the Netherlands. Figure 1
shows the evolution of the Turkish left since the 1960s (for the interest of clarity the
table only shows groups that had or have representation in the Netherlands – these
were, however, the most prominent players). See appendixes 1 and 2 for founding
dates, orientations and abbreviations).
Igor Livosky (1992) has authored an excellent study on the emergence and
development of radical left parties in Turkey between 1960 and 1980. It analyses the
rise of complex and fragmented legal and illegal left movements in the context of
changing political opportunities, in which the military coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980
were crucial. The socialist movement in Turkey was completely banned between 1950
and 1960. In 1960, in the face of acute social, economic and political crisis, a group of
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1 Interview with a former Dev Yol activist in exile, Amsterdam, 6 October 2004. 
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patriotic military officers overthrew the government and adopted a new democratic and
liberal constitution (1961). This paved the way for the surfacing of ideological currents
that had long been suppressed. A legal left movement emerged in Turkey in which
diverse left-wing radicals, social democrats, trade unionists and Marxists were active,
stylizing themselves and the movement as ‘socialist.’ Only the official communist party
TKP – which had existed since the 1920s – remained prohibited and operated
clandestinely (Lipovsky, 1992: 1-3).
Between 1961 and 1971 many members of the socialist movement acted
through the legal Marxist workers party TIP, founded in 1961. Other non-party leftist
groups set up their own organisations, which first supported but later clashed with the
TIP. These groups represented a wide spectrum ranging from the left wing of the
social-democratic CHP to underground Marxist organisations. The struggle between
the various ideological currents and the electoral failure of the TIP in 1969 led to a
crisis that split the TIP around 1971 (Lipovsky, 1992: 67-82 ; Poulton, 1997: 211). The
most important product of this split was the emergence of the student confederation
Dev Genç, in which many future leaders of leftwing organisations were active.
But Dev Genç was short-lived. Within two years, it had splintered into small
groups of revolutionaries each with their own organisations. They proliferated under
the influence of external events such as Mao’s radicalism in the Cultural Revolution of
the late 1960s and the student revolt in Paris of 1968 (Poulton 1997: 211). Given the
political climate, the Turkish extreme left increasingly came to advocate armed
struggle; their acts of terror helped plunge the country into the chaos that led to the
coup of 12 March 1971 (Lipovsky 1992: 1). The declaration of martial law in major
urban areas and in the provinces where Kurdish nationalists were active paralysed
political life: youth organisations and meetings of professional organisations and
unions were banned (see Ahmad, 1993; McDowall, 1996). New groups – both Maoist
and Marxist-Leninist – appeared, with former Dev-Genç cadre dissolving into the
various splinter groups.
The socialist movement flourished with the handing back of power to the
political parties in 1973. Ideological, political, and personal differences among
socialists, however, led to fierce struggles both within the camp and against the rising
groups of nationalists, the so called Ülkücü Ocakları (Idealist Hearths) (Landau, 1981:
148). The Ülkücü Ocakları began breaking up leftist meetings to defend Turkey from
‘communism’ (Landau, 1974; “ınar and Arıkan, 2002), prompting responses from the
revolutionary group Dev Yol and the workers and peasant party TIKP (both with
origins in the Dev Genç movement). Dev Yol organised local ‘anti-fascist’ resistance
committees across Turkey to combat the ‘imperialism’ of the right. The TIKP blasted
the ‘fascism’ of both nationalist groups as well as the Moscow-oriented communist
party TKP, whom they considered ‘social fascists’ (Turkije Informatie, 1978).2
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2 An important party that originated in the leftist movement was the Kurdish party PKK. Since,
Kurdish nationalism soon overshadowed leftist ideology of the PKK and the development of
this party is a study an sich, the PKK is left out in this study. 
The struggle between left and right, however, was unequal. This was due not
only to their numbers (60 000 armed militants on the left against 100 000 on the right),
but to the police and security forces having become the preserve of the nationalist party
MHP. With the MHP in government between 1974 and 1977, and then again under
Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, the police and security forces were heavily infiltrated by
MHP sympathizers. This protected the Grey Wolves, the MHP’s youth movement
(Landau, 1981; Zürcher, 2004:263 ; Pope and Pope, 1997: 132).
By the end of the decade, violence no longer only consisted of reciprocal
killings by left and rightwing extremists. Both groups began to kill public figures, such
as the deputy chairman of the MHP and a leftist trade union leader. Whole
neighbourhoods came under the control of one or the other of the competing groups
and were declared ‘liberated areas’. With the authorities seemingly unable to restore
order, and with the economy in crisis, the army returned to power on 12 September
1980 (“ınar and Arıkan, 2002: 28; Zürcher, 2004: 264).
All power was now in the hands of the military. Under a new law on political
parties, politicians were banned from politics for ten years and their parties dissolved.
Political leaders were arrested; parliamentarians and local administrators discharged. A
state of emergency was declared throughout the country, from which no one was
allowed to leave. Furthermore, anti-terrorist campaigns no longer only targeted leftist
activists, but the MHP and the Grey Wolves as well. By 1982, 80 000 people were
imprisoned and torture was widespread (Zürcher, 2004: 278-280).
The military interventions of 1971 and 1980 heavily influenced leftist strategy.
Most groups continued their activities in exile or illegally in Turkey itself. The
activities of the Moscow-oriented communist party TKP, officially prohibited from the
late 1960s until 1975, were mainly based outside Turkey. The party was directed from
cites in socialist countries like Moscow or Prague, where TKP leaders resided (see
Landau 1974: 105). Due to the increasing population of Turkish workers and refugees,
Europe – and especially Germany – became the main exile base for leaders of illegal
left parties in the late 1970s and 1980s.
A civilian government replaced the military after general elections in
November 1983. In contrast to the previous return to civilian rule, these elections did
not fully restore the political freedoms that had existed prior to the 1980 coup
(Lipovsky 1992: 167). With its figureheads either in jail or in exile, the left now
remained excluded from the legal political arena. While the political spectrum had
broadened again by 1987 (old leaders were running political parties behind the scenes
and making still officially illegal political statements), it was not until 1993 that
political parties were allowed to re-open using their traditional names (Argun, 2003:
140; GüneÒ-Ayata, 2002: 106). In the meantime, internal divisions and ideological
confusion following the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 had reduced the ranks of the left
(Østergaard-Nielsen, 2003: 49).
The early 1990s witnessed the founding of new parties, many of which had
their origins in the late 1960s student movement Dev Genç. Though their memberships
were small, they represented the full spectrum of ideologies that had been present in
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the 1970s. A group sympathetic to Mao and Albanian communism were organised in
EMEP. A wide range of illegal radical left parties also arose, the most important of
which were the Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Front, DHKP/C, and the Marxist
Leninist Communist Party, MLKP (Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b: 50). Today, groups that
used to follow the Moscow-oriented communists are mainly represented in the legal
ÖDP. 
The choice to continue politics within a legal or illegal party obviously
affected strategy. Legal parties, including EMEP and ÖDP, participated in the 2002
general elections, though none passed the ten per cent threshold. Wishing to improve
upon their negligible success in electoral politics, many of these parties have
increasingly come to emphasise international mobilisation, for example through
participation in international anti-globalisation movements such as the World Social
Forum (Baykan and Lelandais, 2004: 520). 
In contrast to the legal left, radical groups such as DHKP/C and the MLKP
have continued the violent strategies of their forerunners and retain their armed wings.
Like their predecessors, some of their leaders live in exile in Europe. Party
programmes also resemble earlier ones. DHKP/C, for example, aims to organise people
in Turkey into people’s councils to build a mass movement (DHKC, 1998: 142) in
order to beat ‘fascism and state terrorism’ (Kurtulus, 1997: 149-151) through
‘democratic’ revolution. ‘If necessary the people will fight for justice’ (DHKC, 1998;
DHKP, 1995; DHKC, 1998). One of the most visible activities of the DHKP/C and
MLKP is their support of prisoners detained for activities within their respective
parties. Protesting against the suppression of a prison rebellion, DHKP/C killed a
businessman in Istanbul in 1996 (Pope and Pope, 1997: 127). The non-governmental
organisation TAYAD supports DHKP/C and MLKP militants by reporting on hunger
strikes, cases of torture and on missing members (TAYAD Solidarity Committee,
2001). TAYAD further supported the DHKP/C and MLKP ‘Death Fast Resistance’ of
prisoners protesting prison reforms to detain them separately (Anderson, 2004: 823).
Between 2000 and 2003, more than 2 000 prisoners participated in the ‘Death Fast
Resistance’; 107 died (Anderson 2004: 817). After intervention by the security forces
to suppress the strikes in 2001, relatives and friends of the striking prisoners began
solidarity death fasts in Istanbul (Kulaksiz, 2003).
HOMELAND POLITICS OF EXILES AND MIGRANT WORKERS
IN THE 1970S AND 1980S IN THE NETHERLANDS
Leftwing organisations established by migrants mirrored political develop-
ments in Turkey. Emigration to Western Europe in the 1970s offered banned parties
such as the TKP a liberal political climate for the mobilization of guest workers
(Landau, 1974: 105; Turkije Informatie, 1978: 23). In many cases they aimed to recruit
workers in Western Europe so that their movements would be strengthened once
migrants returned to Turkey (for Germany see Miller, 1981). However, in the early
1980s – paralleling the situation in Turkey – radical left politics among migrants
moved out of public view and into an atmosphere pervaded by rumour and
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intimidation. Many members of the Turkish community now feared taking strong
political stands and did not want to be seen as part of any one particular political group
(Penninx, 1980).
The military interventions of 1971 and 1980 led to the arrival of Turkish
political migrants in Europe, individuals who had been members of revolutionary
organisations in Turkey and who now brought their political convictions with them (for
Germany see Miller, 1981: 53-54). In contrast to the political refugees of the 1980s,
refugees after the 1971 coup did not ask for asylum but arrived in the Netherlands more
or less ‘unnoticed’ as ‘guest workers’ (Bakker, Vervloet and Gailly, 2002: 212). Young
extreme right Ülkücü Ocakları leaders also sought political asylum in Europe to escape
the left-right violence in the schools and universities (see also Van Esbroeck, 1979;
Geerse, 1998). In this way, conflict between the left and right in Turkey was
transplanted to the Netherlands.
The focus on Turkish politics among leftist migrant workers increased
dramatically after the coup in 1980. Political refugees swelled their ranks. Mirroring
internal and ideological divides in Turkey, a wide spectrum of radical leftist groups
continued their activities in exile and mobilized workers for their party in Turkey. Each
of these parties had its own network with members throughout Europe (see also Özcan
1992). In the Netherlands they organised activities against the Turkish junta separately,
cooperating instead with their counterparts in Germany. They demonstrated in front of
national parliaments, organised hunger strikes and shared their views of political
developments in Turkey with the European public and governments through magazines
and pamphlets (see for Dev Yol Turkije Informatie, 1981; for Dev Sol Turkije-Nieuws,
1981).
To illustrate these developments, the next subsections describe how political
orientations were reflected by Turkish migrant organisations. Although numerous
organisations were founded in this period, we focus exclusively on two organisations
that exist to this day. The first, HTIB, represented Moscow-oriented communism and
was founded in response to the 1971 coup; the second, DIDF, was Maoist-oriented and
a response to the coup of 1980.
Moscow-oriented leftist organisations: the foundation of HTIB
The first leftist organisation for Turkish labour migrants in the Netherlands,
HTIB, was established in 1974 by a group of Turkish workers and refugees who had
fled the military repression of 1971 (Can and Can-Engin, 1997: 66). With its Marxist
orientation, the HTIB sympathised with the communist party of Turkey, TKP. HTIB’s
initial goal was to include migrant workers living in the Netherlands within the Turkish
people’s struggle for a democratic Turkey. At the same time, HTIB assisted Turkish
migrant workers in their ‘struggle’ for rights in the Netherlands.
The ‘struggle’ in the Netherlands included activities against the establishment
Turkish organisations. Paralleling developments in Turkey in the 1970s, leftwing
Turkish groups in the Netherlands fought one another as well as rightwing groups
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(Turkije Informatie, 1977; Rath, 1985). In 1977 HTIB campaigned to ban from the
Netherlands organisations of the Grey Wolves which sympathized with the Turkish
nationalist party MHP (Turkije Informatie 1977a). At the same time HTIB was opposed
by smaller Maoist groups who viewed both the TKP and HTIB as representatives of
‘social fascism’.
Between 1975 and 1979 HTIB evolved into a national umbrella organisation
with different branches in the Netherlands. The organisation also established close ties
with Turkish organisations in other European countries that supported the Turkish
communist party TKP.3 HTIB also acceded to the Federation of Turkish Workers
Associations in West Germany, FIDEF.4
The establishment of TKP headquarters in Germany and the arrival of TKP
leaders in the Netherlands reveal how Moscow-oriented organisations were influenced
from abroad. TKP influence on HTIB now rose enormously. TKP leaders became
members of HTIB and in 1982 established a committee for the defence of human rights
in Turkey (NTKVMD) which sought to put international pressure on the Turkish junta.
Their activities included lobbying the Dutch parliament and human rights organisations
such as Amnesty International. At the same time, its members tried ‘to recruit TKP
members, who eventually would return to Turkey and start a revolution’.5 It was,
however, difficult to continue the party’s work from abroad. As a former TKP member
in exile explains: ‘our cadre in Turkey were being tortured or were in hiding. It was
extremely difficult to remain in contact.’6
Although TKP adherence was prominent among HTIB members, it is
important to note that the Moscow-oriented TKP was not the only party with which
they sympathised. For example, the present chairman of HTIB, a member of the TKP
in the Netherlands in the 1980s, was active in the Albania-oriented Maoist party Dev
Yol when living in Turkey. One member of the TKP administrative board who
continued her activities within HTIB was previously active in the workers party TIP
and the Kurdish workers party PKK. Dev Yol adherents were to be found in Turkish
workers organisations throughout the Netherlands, not only within HTIB. In the mid-
1980s, TKP members within HTIB tried to work together with exiles from other
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3 HTIB archive International Institute for Social History (IISH), Amsterdam:
http://www.iisg.nl/archives/en/files/h/10751062.php, accessed in May 2005.
4 The FIDEF brought together organisations in Europe that sympathized with the Turkish
Kemalist party, CHP, and the confederation of socialist trade unions, DISK. In those days
DISK attracted CHP as well as TKP followers. Turkije Informatie (1978) Regeringswisseling,
Turkije Informatie. On the FIDEF inauguration congress representatives of DISK and the CHP
held speeches. The highlight of the event was a taped speech of the CHP leader Ecevit. Turkije
Infomatie (1977) Verkiezingen en geweld. Vervolg dossier Grijze wolven, Turkije Informatie.
5 Interview with HTIB chairman and former member of Dev Yol and the TKP, Amsterdam,
19 October 2004.
6 Interview with former TIP, TKP, DISK, PKK, HTIB and HTKB member, Istanbul, 19 January
2004.
political movements (see also Turkije Informatie, 1978). An umbrella organisation in
exile was created in 1986, made up of individuals from the TKP, Dev Yol, PKK, and
the workers parties TSIP and TIP. Due to internal and ideological conflicts, however, it
quickly dissolved.7 Despite the ideological and personal conflicts, involvement in
Turkish movements in exile became the basis for long-term friendships, as will be seen
in the next section.
Only a year later, in 1987, the TKP at a meeting in Brussels merged with the
Worker’s Party of Turkey (TIP) to become the United Communist Party of Turkey
(TBKP). Although the penal code still made communist politics illegal in Turkey,
Prime Minister Özel hinted that restrictions might be lifted. The leaders of the TBKP
returned to Turkey on 11 November and were jailed upon arrival (Zürcher, 2004: 284-
285).
The TKP dissolved in 1989 after the fall of the Berlin wall.8 Internal TKP
conflicts over the merger with TIP heavily influenced HTIB in the Netherlands, whose
members were mainly comprised of first generation labour migrants attached to the
TKP. When the TKP merged with the TIP, many members left the organisation.9 Dev
Yol-affiliated organisations in Germany also began to redirect their efforts towards
migrant issues (Özcan, 1992).
Around the same period, HTIB concluded that the ‘temporary’ stay of Turkish
labour migrants in the Netherlands had become permanent. The organisation
accordingly redirected the focus of its activities from Turkey to the Netherlands (Van
den Meerendonk and Tilburg, 1988). HTIB thus began to cooperate with Turkish
organisations of different political colours through the IOT, the Consultative Council of
Turks of the Dutch government. IOT represents a variety of Turkish migrant
federations that, like HTIB, are rooted in the turbulent 1970s. Although the various
groups have clashed in the past and their previous political orientations remain visible,
their common position as Turkish migrants in the Netherlands brings them together in
the IOT. To prevent conflict based on ideological differences, IOT members do not
discuss Turkish politics during meetings.
Pro-Albanian organisations: the foundation of DIDF
Before the 1980 coup, a small but militant group following Albanian
communism was active in the Netherlands (its European headquarters was in
Germany). With the arrival of Revolutionary Communist Party of Turkey (TDKP)
cadre in the Netherlands after the 1980 coup, the federation DIDF was founded in 1985
(Van Zuthum, 1994: 24; Den Exter and Hessels, 2003: 11). Its independent sister
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7 Ibid.
8 Interview with HTIB chairman and former member of Dev Yol and the TKP, Amsterdam,
19 October 2004.
9 HTIB archive International Institute for Social History (IISH), Amsterdam:
http://www.iisg.nl/archives/en/files/h/10751062.php, accessed in May 2005.
organisation in Germany had existed since 1980 (see also Özcan, 1992: 261-264). The
official aim of DIDF in Germany was twofold: to represent the interests of Turkish
workers and to support the reinstallation of democracy in Turkey. In practice, it mainly
organised activities against the junta in Turkey.
Although political refugees affiliated with the TDKP established the DIDF, the
former’s influence on the latter remains unclear. Together with radical Dutch anti-
racism organisations, DIDF since its foundation has championed full equality for
foreigners. With respect to Turkey, DIDF has supported repressed groups and
individuals, mainly Kurds (Van Zuthum, 1994: 24); the organisation pleads for the
Kurdish right to self-determination and the acknowledgement of Kurdish rights in
Turkey.10 Likewise, one of its goals in the Netherlands is to contribute to full equality
and participation of all people from Turkey (De Voogd and Van der Meulen, 2002).
DIDF argues that the Turkish immigrant community is (ethnically) divided through the
interference of the Turkish government via its consulates; it further criticises the Dutch
government for directing policies towards ‘ethnic’ Turks and not for people from
Turkey, thereby excluding Kurds from full participation. This is one reason why DIDF
(as opposed to HTIB) is not a member of the Consultative Council of Turks in the
Netherlands, IOT.
TRANSNATIONAL PARTY POLITICS OF THE LEGAL TURKISH
LEFT SINCE THE 1990S
Since the late 1980s HTIB and DIDF have concentrated their activities on the
position of Turkish migrants in the Netherlands. Both have become active in immigrant
politics, while their members have started to represent Dutch parties in local politics.11
But while HTIB has abandoned its mission towards Turkey, DIDF has not. How does
the HTIB’s sole focus on the Netherlands and the DIDF’s focus on both Turkey and the
Netherlands influence their transnational ties with groups in Turkey? 
Presently, individual HTIB members maintain good relations with members
and leaders of the legal left parties founded in the late 1990s such as the new TKP (no
extension of the old TKP) and other small socialist parties founded in the early 1990s,
such as DSIP. The transnational contacts are personal in nature – continuations of
friendships established during past involvement within the TKP and Dev Yol, while
still living in Turkey or in exile in the Netherlands. Some TKP and DSIP cadre lived in
exile in the Netherlands for several years, and after their return to Turkey founded or
joined these new parties.12
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10 Interview with DIDF chairman, Amsterdam, 15 July 2004.
11 Interview with HTIB chairman and former member of Dev Yol and the TKP, Amsterdam,
19 October 2004.
12 Ibid.
As noted in the previous section, HTIB also harboured people who were (also)
or used to be members of Dev Yol. As in Turkey, many former Dev Yol cadre in the
Netherlands regrouped into the left socialist party ÖDP. In 1997, one year after the
foundation of ÖDP in Turkey, a former Dev Yol exile and ex-HTIB chairman founded
the ÖDP solidarity committee – ÖDK – in the Netherlands.13 Though founded by a
former HTIB leader, ÖDK has no ties with that organisation. Instead ÖDK regrouped
former Dev Yol adherents in the Netherlands, who were previously spread over several
Turkish workers organisations. ÖDK in the Netherlands has 132 members who pay
contributions to the mother party and around 500 sympathizers. In Germany this
number lies somewhere between 800 and 1,000.14 ÖDK further has a European
umbrella – ÖDK Europe – that unites branches in the Netherlands, France, Belgium,
England, Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Every six months they meet to discuss
problems of Turks residing in Europe. Their findings are reported to the mother party
in Turkey to advise it on specific issues relating to Turks living in Europe. In addition
ÖDK takes part in party congresses. ÖDP claims that the input of ÖDK members
broadens the vision of the party as many individuals are active in political parties in
Europe; their skills and political experience are highly valued.15 The ÖDK chairman in
the Netherlands, for instance, is a municipal councillor for the Dutch Green Party in
Amsterdam. In addition, the ÖDK financially supports the pro-ÖDP newspaper Birgün.
Although the daily is available only in Turkey, ÖDK members contribute articles and
weekly columns.16
Furthermore, ÖDP receives electoral support from ÖDK Europe. In 2003,
ÖDP leaders toured in Europe to ask for assistance in campaigning for the 2004 local
elections.17 In response, ÖDK members organised trips to Bahadin (Yozgat province,
Central Anatolian Region) and Hopa (Artvin province, Black Sea Region). They
arrived in cars with Dutch plates to show they had come all the way from the
Netherlands in support.18 Those with Turkish passports voted. Those who stayed in
Europe contacted their friends and relatives in Turkey and advised them to vote for
ÖDP.19 The ÖDP in Turkey also entered the 2004 local elections under the banner of
the social democratic party SHP. While the alliance united small parties like EMEP, the
Kurdish party DEHAP, ÖDP and the social democratic SDP, it proved difficult for
organisations that supported these parties to campaign together in the Netherlands.
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13 Interview with ÖDK NL chairman and former Dev Yol activist and HTIB chairman,
Amsterdam, 6 October 2004.
14 Ibid. 
15 Interview with ÖDP co- founder and member of the party assembly, Ankara, 11 November
2004. 
16 Interview with ÖDK NL chairman, Amsterdam, 6 October 2004 and interview with ÖDP co-
founder and member of the party assembly, Ankara, 11 November 2004.
17 Notes of meetings of ÖDP Europe: 4-5 January 2003, 8-9 May 2004 in Basel, Switzerland;
15-16 November 2003 in Paris, France; 31 January-1 February 2004 in Mainz, Germany.
Received by email from ÖDP co-founder and member of the party assembly, November
2004. 
18 Interview with ÖDK NL chairman, Amsterdam, 6 October 2004.
19 Interview with ÖDP co-founder and member of the party assembly, Ankara, 11 November
2004.
Following the 1999 local elections the ÖDP won the mayoralties of Geçit
(Erzincan province) and Agilbasi (Malatya province) in the East Anatolian Region.
After the 2004 municipal elections they lost their local power but gained mayoralties in
Hopa (Artvin province) in the Black Sea Region and in Bahadin (Yozgat province) in
the Central Anatolian Region. The ÖDP wants to make these villages exemplary, and
towards this end ÖDK Europe sends money and material goods. Especially Bahadin is
an interesting case. A typical emigration village, temporary returnees from Europe or
large Turkish cities swell its population from 500 in winter to 3,200 in summer.20 The
ÖDP mayor himself is a return migrant from Germany whose election campaign was
coordinated by the ‘Bahadin hemÒeri organisations’ in Europe and Turkey. These
organisations, which refer to common local origin, were established in the mid-1980s.
In fact they channelled Dev Yol politics, since the outlawed movement could not
openly exist. Today these organisations are used to facilitate ÖDP politics in Bahadin.21
Why is a small party like ÖDP so well-organised in Western Europe? Much of
the explanation lies in the previous involvement of its European followers in the
illegal, Albania-oriented Maoist party Dev Yol. Connected via dense networks, former
Dev Yol supporters over the years established numerous organisations that now form
the basis of the European branch of ÖDP. Many ÖDP members have lived in exile in
Western Europe, and maintain contacts with fellow party members who opted to settle
in Europe permanently. And with the prominence of returnees in the party, the ÖDP
supports policies that favour Turks living abroad.
Thus contacts of present HTIB members with Turkish political parties
continued on a personal level, with former Dev Yol cadre creating an official solidarity
committee for the ÖDP. Although there is insufficient information to compare past and
present contacts with political parties of the formerly Albanian oriented federation,
DIDF, the latter’s transnational trajectory clearly differs from that of HTIB and former
Dev Yol cadre. Reflecting developments in Turkey, individual members of DIDF now
support EMEP (both this Turkish party and DIDF were founded by former TDKP
cadre). Although DIDF has no formal ties with EMEP, its members maintain regular
contact with the party in Turkey, with the DIDF’s chairman visiting EMEP congresses
in Turkey and EMEP’s leader regularly lecturing at DIDF gatherings.22 Both EMEP
and DIDF have similar stances on Turkish politics and Turkish migrants in Europe, for
instance on the desirability of Turkish workers to fully participate in political parties
and trade unions in the Netherlands23, and on the position of Kurds (in both Turkey and
the Netherlands). This is explicitly reflected in DIDF being an organisation for
migrants from Turkey, rather than one for ethnic Turks.
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20 Interview with the coordinator of Bahadin committees in Europe and Turkey, advisor of
mayor of Bahadin and former Dev Yol activist, Ankara, 11 November 2004.
21 Ibid.
22 Interview with DIDF chairman, Amsterdam, 15 July 2004.
23 Interview with EMEP chairman, Istanbul, 13 February 2005.
More importantly, DIDF supported EMEP in the national elections of 2002
and in local elections two years later. EMEP entered the 2002 elections under the
banner of the Kurdish party DEHAP. Together with the Kurdish Federation FED-KOM,
DIDF founded a DEHAP solidarity committee in the Netherlands. Together they
organised a one-day voting trip to Istanbul (Ülger, 2002: 10). In total ten airplanes were
charted for DEHAP voters in Europe (ANP, 2002). Most supporters simply cast their
ballots, while others helped in fundraising and campaigning.24 In the Netherlands
DIDF and FED-KOM organised a meeting during the election campaign to underline
Turkish and Kurdish fraternity, while the leader of EMEP was invited for another joint
meeting.25 EMEP and DEHAP entered the 2004 local elections in coalition with and
under the name of the Social Democratic People’s Party, the SHP. DIDF did not urge
its members to vote, but said: ‘If you happen to go and if you still have a right to vote,
vote for SHP. If you have relatives who are in doubt, advise them to vote for SHP.’26
Finally, DIDF supports the pro-EMEP Turkish newspaper Evrensel, especially its
European edition, with articles.27
This section has traced the development of the transnational political ties of
Turkish workers’ organisations in the Netherlands such as HTIB and DIDF after the
revolutionary parties they sympathized with lost importance or became the basis for
new legal political parties in Turkey. It further illustrated how former Dev Yol cadre in
the Netherlands – the group that took to the streets in Turkey to fight right-wing
movements in the 1970s – remained loyal to the movement by establishing an official
branch of the Turkish party that has its own roots in Dev Yol. HTIB’s sole focus on the
position of migrants in the Netherlands and DIDF’s aim of promoting change in Turkey
is reflected in the development of their relations with Turkish political parties. While
the ties of both organisations with Turkish political parties have weakened, they have
also evolved quite differently. HTIB’s transnational political contacts have become
personal in nature, while those of DIDF remain (though not formally) on an
organisational level.
REPRESENTATION OF THE ILLEGAL TURKISH LEFT IN THE
NETHERLANDS SINCE THE 1990S
The strategies of leftwing parties established in the 1990s that remain illegal in
Turkey are similar to those seen in the 1970s and 1980s. Leaders reside in exile in
European countries, where they more or less freely continue their activities. They have
created party branches in European cities, connected through dense networks, and have
become active in migrant politics and organisations. They try to pressure the Turkish
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24 Interview with DEHAP Vice-President, Ankara 10 December 2004.
25 Interview with DIDF chairman, Amsterdam, 15 July 2004.
26 Ibid.
27 Interview with a journalist of Evrensel, Istanbul, 9 August 2003 and with DIDF chairman,
Amsterdam, 15 July 2004. 
state by lobbying national governments and European institutions. This section traces
the activities of the two most important groups, DHKP/C and MLKP. 
As figure 1 shows, DHKP/C originates in Dev Yol but broke away a year after
its founding to establish DHKP/C’s forerunner Dev Sol. Although Dev Sol activists
were clearly represented in the Netherlands and Europe in the 1970s and 1980s – they
had their own bulletin – it is unclear whether they were represented in any Turkish
organisation. Studies on Germany show that Dev Yol headquarters publicly distanced
itself from Dev Sol (Özcan, 1992).
Regarding the forerunners (TKP/ML) of the MLKP, we only know that
adherents founded a federation in Germany in 1977. We do not know where and how
they were represented in the Netherlands. The reason for this gap in the data stems
from the illegality of these parties in Turkey itself. In 2000 DHKP/C was put on the list
of European terrorist organisations, though it was only outlawed in Germany and the
UK. This meant that it was difficult to find representatives in the Netherlands. When I
did, they were quite reluctant to talk. Thus in addition to the more conversation-like
interviews I had with sympathizers of these two parties, I used secondary material
including their pamphlets, websites, publications, newspaper articles and went (with
them) to demonstrations to conduct participant observation. For security reasons I did
not search for these groups in Turkey, as I did for the other parties. The analysis of their
strategies begins around their foundation in the mid-1990s when they chose to continue
an illegal revolutionary course.
In the Netherlands DHKP/C sympathizers follow a peaceful path; several
dozen are actively involved in the party (AIVD, 2004:  26). A branch of the party was
located in Amsterdam between 1995 and 2003 but has since moved to Brussels.28
Nevertheless, DHKP/C followers openly show their affiliation with the party. On
1 May 2005 they marched through the city of Rotterdam carrying flags of the party.29
DHKP International, headquartered in Brussels, celebrated the anniversary of the party
in the Netherlands in 2002 and 2005, where they commemorated their revolutionary
martyrs including THKP founder Mahir Cayan.30 The music group GrupYorum often
performs during these celebrations. In its political songs, the band criticizes the Turkish
state and expresses its solidarity with leftwing political activists and prisoners. Because
the Turkish state considers Grup Yorum a part of DHKP/C, some musicians have been
imprisoned while others have found refuge in Europe.31 News and books on activities
of the DHKP/C are published by Press Agency Özgürlük in Amsterdam.
Despite the DHKP/C being legal in the Netherlands, the Dutch government
cooperated in an international police raid against potential DHKP/C-affiliated
organisations in 2004. In response DHKP/C members participated in what they called
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28 Interview with a spokesman of Press Agency Özgürlük, Amsterdam 17 September 2004. 
29 http://www.dhkc.info/668.0.html, accessed on 4 May 2006. 
30 http://www.dhkc.info/DHKC_International.435+M5682345ee0c.0.html and
http://www.dhkc.net, accessed on 14 April 2006.
31 Interview with Grup Yorum representative, Istanbul, 8 January 2005.
the ‘International Platform Against Isolation’ in Brussels, mobilizing European lawyers
and human rights advocates to observe the trials of DHKP/C activists in Istanbul later
that year.32
Some DHKP/C sympathizers are active in the Anatolian Cultural Centre, a
Turkish migrant organisation in Rotterdam. Besides offering regular cultural activities,
it organises and funds meetings about socialism for youths in Turkey.33 The centre
itself is not formally linked to the party; its sympathies, however, are obvious. At the
building’s entrance is a corner with photos dedicated to the ‘martyrs’ of the armed wing
in Tokat (Black Sea Region). The Centre also holds memorial meetings for friends and
family of organisational members who have died fighting the Turkish army.34
In the Netherlands, DHKP/C is organised around the Dutch branch of the
Association for the Support of the Families of Prisoners, TAYAD. The Dutch branch of
TAYAD raises funds for the organisation in Turkey35 and attempts to influence the
Dutch government by writing letters to parliament.36 DHKP/C adherents in the
Netherlands have further organised hunger strikes in solidarity with the Death Fast
Resistance in Turkish prisons.37 In 2000 a hunger strike in Rotterdam was dramatically
interrupted when one of the participants was killed by Turkish nationalists. The
relationship between TAYAD and DHKP/C became very visible during a demon-
stration of the European TAYAD branches in Brussels in 2004.38 This demonstration in
solidarity with the Death Fast Resistance was attended by DHKP/C members in exile,
representatives of the International DHKP/C headquarter in Brussels, and the Anatolian
Cultural Centre. The demonstrators protested in front of the European parliament and
the Turkish embassy holding photos of hunger strikers who had died in Turkey while
shouting the names of DHKP/C ‘martyrs’.
The MLKP in the Netherlands is even smaller than the DHKP/C. It is made up
of a tiny group of sympathisers involved in non-violent actions such as participating in
Dutch leftwing demonstrations (AIVD, 2005: 23). In their European magazine journal
the party publishes solidarity statements for the ‘martyred’ members of their armed
wing in Turkey (MLKP, 2005). MLKP members are also organised in the cultural
organisation VEKSAV, linked to the cultural magazine Hayat ve Sanat (Life and Art) in
Turkey and its European federation in Germany. VEKSAV organises politically-loaded
cultural activities.39 On the European level VEKSAV participates in the European
Confederation of Oppressed Immigrants, AVEG-Kon, which organises protests against
globalisation, discrimination and the expulsion of political refugees who supported the
Death Fast Resistance in Turkey, in which MLKP and DHKP/C prisoners participated.40
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32 Personal communication with delegate from the UK at TAYAD demonstration in Brussels,
21 October 2004.
33 Interview with a volunteer for the Anadolu Kultur Merkezi, Rotterdam, 6 October 2004.
34 Ibid. 
35 Interview with a spokesman of Press Agency Özgürlük, Amsterdam 17 September 2004.
36 Press Release ‘Tayad stuurt brief naar Tweede Kamer’, TAYAD Komite, 13 November 2001.
37 Interview with a volunteer of the Anadolu Kultur Merkezi, Rotterdam, 6 October 2004.
38 Observations of the author during TAYAD demonstration in Brussels, 21 October 2004.
39 Hayat ve Sanat invitation, Den Haag, 8 October 2005.
40 See also http://thecaravan.org/files/caravan/Berber_de.pdf, accessed in May 2006.
Interestingly, the branches and members of the illegal parties mentioned in this
section and the representatives and sympathizers of the legal Turkish parties all
participate in the Dutch demonstration platform Keer het Tij. This platform – which
unites roughly 500 leftwing organisations and parties – was founded in 2002, a
response to the more conservative Dutch government that came to power that year.
Sympathizers, members and branches of Turkish leftwing parties – the illegal parties
MLKP, TKP/ML, TKIP and DHKP/C; the migrant organisations DIDF, HTIB and the
Anatolian Cultural Centre; the branch ÖDK and the Turkish NGO TAYAD – were all
present at a Keer het Tij demonstration in 2005.41 In their struggle for (what they
consider) social justice, they have found common ground in protest movements in the
Netherlands.
CONCLUSION
To return to the central question of this paper: how can the different trajec-
tories of transnationally active migrant organisations with a shared political orientation
– in this case the radical left – be explained? The key explanatory factors revealed by
existing scholarship are migration motives, political opportunities in the receiving
country and the country of origin, and length of stay. These factors – while also
applicable to the Turkish radical left in the Netherlands – need to be sharpened. 
As shown in this paper, changes in opportunities for the left in Turkey
influenced ties with migrant organisations in the Netherlands. In the 1970s and 1980s
the Turkish left as a whole was formally excluded from political participation in
Turkey. Leftwing political movements continued their activities in Turkish labour
organisations and branches in exile, connected through dense European networks.
Their activities, networks and strategies clearly reflected the specific context in which
their sister organisations in Turkey operated.
With relative political stability in Turkey in the 1990s, some radical left
groups became legal parties. This influenced Turkish migrant organisations abroad:
organisations that had sympathized with previously illegal movements in Turkey
shifted the focus of their activities to the country of settlement. They not only realized
most members would stay in the Netherlands permanently (as happened with other
organisations); the shift was also due to the legalization of their sister movements in
Turkey. Coordination from abroad was no longer necessary. 
Although migrant organisations maintained contacts with these newly-founded
political parties, their transnational contacts differed substantially. Organisations that
completely lost their mission towards Turkey only maintained contacts on a personal
level. Where at least some homeland-directed purpose remained, more formal
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41 Observations of the author at Keer het Tij demonstration, The Hague, 24 September 2005.
See also the list of member organisations at: http://www.keerhettij.nl/organisaties.htm,
accessed in April 2007.
organisational contacts were kept alive. Finally, we see that the transnational contacts
of Turkish parties founded by exiles who returned to Turkey are more likely to exist on
an organisational level.
The importance of organisational developments in the homeland for
transnational politics becomes clear when this experience is contrasted with that of
organisations that sympathized with Turkish parties and movements that remained
illegal after 1990. The path of newly-founded illegal parties has echoed those of illegal
movements in the 1970s and 1980s. They continue to politicize immigrant
organisations – no longer those of temporary labour migrants, but the cultural
organisations of permanent migrants. And like exiles in the past, their European
networks are crucial as they lobby for the protection of the rights of their members in
Turkey at national and European levels.
Current ties between migrants and/or organisations and legal Turkish parties
are mainly used to provide electoral support. Migrants only seem to have a voice in
party matters and policy when the majority of the administrative board in Turkey has a
migrant history as well. On the other hand, ties with illegal parties that continue to exist
are still vital for the existence of these parties and their leaderships. 
What this shows is that transnational politics are not only a question of
activities or loyalties that transcend national borders. The organisational networks that
allow loyalties to be translated into activities are likewise transnational. What happens
at the organisational nodes in the country of origin is thus often crucial for develop-
ments in the country of settlement. Indeed, many groups that are often seen unproble-
matically as migrant organisations have only become true migrant organisations after
their sister organisations in the homeland chose a political path that made support from
abroad obsolete. In this way, homeland politics cast an even longer shadow over
transnational politics than is often acknowledged. 
Whatever trajectory leftwing Turkish organisations in the Netherlands have
chosen over time, there is no indication that maintaining an interest in homeland
politics today hinders integration in the Netherlands or threatens Dutch democracy. On
the contrary – despite differences in ideology, whether supportive of legal or illegal
parties in Turkey, or without organisational ties to Turkey at all – all groups under
study participate in the same Dutch protest platform. This is a sign of integration in and
of itself, since they are demonstrating – sometimes under the banner of a Turkish
political party – to improve their position in the Netherlands. It could even be argued
that previous and present involvement in homeland politics reinforces participation in
the political arena of the country of settlement.
To conclude, these findings suggest that we need to specify homeland-related
factors that determine transnational political practices in the country of settlement.
Instead of assuming that homeland ‘political opportunities’ similarly affect all groups,
we need to ask how specific groups – even within a comparable political stream – are
included or excluded from homeland political participation. Only then will we be able
to explain how and why migrant organisations continue homeland-directed activities,
redirect their interests to the country of settlement, or combine elements of both.
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Abbreviation Turkish name English Translation
AP Adalet Partisi Justice Party
ATTF Avrupa Türk Toplumcular European Federation of Turkish 
Federasyonu Socialists
AVEG-KON Avrupa Ezilen Göçmenler European Confederation of 
Konfederasoynu Oppressed Immigrants
CHP Cumhürriyet Halk Partisi Republican Peoples’ Party
DEHAP Demokratik Halk Partisi Democratic Peoples Party
DIDF Demokratik IÒçi Dernekleri Federation of Democratic Workers
Federasyonu Associations
DISK Türkiye Devrimci IÒçi Confederation of Progressive Trade
Sendikalari Konfederasyonu Unions of Turkey
FED-KOM Federasyona Komelên Kurd Li Federation of Kurdish Associations in
Holland FED-KOM the Netherlands
FIDEF Federal Almanya IÒçi Dernekleri Federation of Turkish Workers
Federasyonu Associations in the BRD
HTIB Hollanda Türkiyeli Isçiler Birlifii Association of Turkish Workers
HTKB Hollanda Türkiyeli Kadınlar Birlifii Turkish Women Organisation in the
Netherlands
IOT Inspraakorgaan Turken Advisory Board of Turks
MHP Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi Nationalist Action Party
NTKVMD Nederlands Turkije Komitee  Dutch Committee for the Defence of 
voor de Verdediging van Human Rights and Democracy
Mensenrechten en Demokratie
ÖDK Özgürlük ve DanyaniÒma ÖDP Solidarity Committee
Koordinasyonu
ÖDK Avrupa Özgürlük ve DanyaniÒma ÖDP Solidarity Committee Europe
Koordinasyonu Avrupa
ÖP Özgurluk Partisi ÖP Free Party
PKK Partiya Karkari Kurdistan Kurdistan Workers Party
SDP Sosyal Demokratik Partisi Social Democratic Party
SHP Soysalistdemokrat Halk Partisi Social Democrat Peoples Party
TAYAD Tutuklu Hükümlü Aileri Association for the Support of the
YardımlaÒma Dernefii Families of Prisoners
VEKSAV Vardiya Kültür Sanat Vakfı Foundation of the Culture and Art
Vardiya
Appendix 2 : List of other mentioned parties and organisations in Turkey
and the Netherlands
L’ombre de la politique du pays d’origine : évolution de la
gauche radicale turque aux Pays-Bas
Liza M. NELL
Cet article examine l’évolution des liens transnationaux des organisations migrantes
avec les partis politiques de la gauche radicale aux Pays-Bas depuis les années soixante-dix. Il
montre la diversité des trajectoires des organisations migrantes orientées de manière trans-
nationale : certaines perdent leur caractère radical contrairement à d’autres qui le maintiennent.
Nombre de facteurs déterminent, selon la littérature, l’engagement politique transnational : les
raisons à l’origine de la migration, la structure des opportunités politiques dans le pays de
résidence et dans le pays d’origine et la durée de séjour des migrants. Toutefois ces facteurs ne
permettent guère d’expliquer la diversité des trajectoires, puisqu’ils concernent de la même
manière toute la gauche turque et, dès lors, ne peuvent rendre compte des différences à l’intérieur
de ce courant politique. Les raisons de ces changements sont à chercher ailleurs. L’analyse
montre que les organisations migrantes ne deviennent des véritables organisations de migrants
que lorsque leur organisation parallèle au pays d’origine a pris une option politique qui ne rend
plus nécessaire un soutien de l’étranger. Au lieu de considérer que les opportunités politiques du
pays d’origine concernent tous les groupes, l’on doit s’interroger sur la manière, dont certains
groupes, appartenant parfois au même courant politique, sont inclus ou exclus de la participation
politique dans le pays d’origine. Enfin l’article montre que contrairement à une opinion
largement partagée, il n’y a guère d’indications selon lesquelles un intérêt soutenu dans le
devenir politique du pays d’origine est un frein à l’intégration politique et constitue une menace
pour la démocratie aux Pays-Bas.
The Shadow of Homeland Politics: Understanding the Evolution of the
Turkish Radical Left in the Netherlands
Liza M. NELL
This article examines evolution of migrants’ organisational transnational ties with
political parties of the Turkish radical left in the Netherlands since the 1970s. It shows that
trajectories of transnationally orientated migrant organisations with a shared political orientation
differ substantially from each other. Some lose their radical edge over the years whereas others
do not. The factors that existing literature commonly identifies as shaping transnational political
involvement —migration motives, political opportunity structures in the receiving country and
the (former) homeland, and migrants’ length of stay— are insufficient to understand this pattern.
They apply to the whole Turkish left in similar measure and therefore cannot account for
variation within this political stream. Explanations for the changes in patterns of transnational
political ties over time hence need to look further. This article argues that migrant organisations
only become true migrant organisations once their sister organisation in the homeland has chosen
a political path that has made support from abroad obsolete. Instead of assuming that homeland
political opportunities similarly affect all groups, we need to ask how specific groups —even
within a comparable political stream— are included or excluded from homeland political
participation. Finally, this article shows, that —contrary to what is generally assumed— in this
case there is no indication that maintaining interest in homeland politics today hinders political
integration or threatens Dutch democracy.
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La sombra de las políticas nacionales : entender la evolución de la
izquierda radical turca en los Países Bajos
Liza M. NELL
Ese artículo observa la evolución de los lazos transnacionales de las organizaciones
migratorias con los partidos políticos de la izquierda radical turca en los Países Bajos desde los
años setenta. Muestra que las trayectorias de organizaciones de migrantes con orientación
transnacional pueden discrepar fuertemente entre ellas. Algunas pierden su carácter radical con el
paso del tiempo mientras otras no. Los factores explicativos del compromiso político trans-
nacional sobresalientes en la literatura — motivos de migración, estructuras de oportunidad
política en los países de origen y de acogida, y la duración de la estancia — no son suficientes
para entender ese fenómeno. Se aplican de la misma forma a la totalidad de la izquierda turca de
suerte que no nos permiten entender las variaciones que ocurren dentro de esa corriente política.
Para entender los cambios en las redes políticas transnacionales con el tiempo, hay que buscar
otro tipo de esclarecimientos. Mostramos que las organizaciones de migrantes se vuelven
verdaderas organizaciones de migrantes una vez que la organización gemela del país de origen
escoge una vía política que hace inútil cualquier asistencia de afuera. En vez de asumir que se
dan las mismas oportunidades políticas a todos los grupos, debemos preguntarnos como grupos
específicos — aunque de la misma corriente política — puedan participar o no a la política en su
país de origen. Y, finalmente, mostramos que al revés de lo que se pretende, no tenemos
elementos para apoyar la idea que el interés mantenido en la política del país de origen sea un
obstáculo a la integración o una amenaza a la democracia holandesa.
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